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Introduction
The Christmas Carol is Charles Dickens’ story about the spiritual conversion of Ebenezer
Scrooge. The story begins with the miser Scrooge niggardly guarding his wealth;
however, as the story develops he encounters a series of spirits who show him the impact
of his approach. The happy ending results when Scrooge sees the harm of his wealth
maximizing ways and broadens opening his range of concern to include a benefit to his
clerk’s crippled son, Tiny Tim. In its essence, The Christmas Carol is an illustration of
the shareholder-stakeholder debate, and that debate is one of the debates at the heart of
corporate governance.1

S. Bottomley observes “‘Corporate Governance’…is a slippery term: it is used both in
discussions about the role of companies in society … and also in discussion about the

1

Farrar writes somewhat reflectively, “…corporate governance is about the legitimacy of corporate power,

corporate accountability, and the standards by which the corporation is to be governed, and by who, it is
obvious that the concept transcends legal standards and liability, perhaps reflecting the fact that the law
deals with minimal morality of obligation rather than a morality of aspiration. Corporate governance is
often about the method as opposed to the substance of corporate decision-making. Nevertheless it seems
too narrow to limit it exclusively to questions of method and good house keeping.” J. Farrar, Corporate
Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, (2002), at p. 431
(hereinafter CG). The complexity and broad scope of corporate governance is well canvassed in S.
Turnbull, “Corporate Governance: Its Scope, concerns and theories.” (October, 1997) 5 Corporate
Governance, (4) pp. 193-196

2

organization of affairs within companies.” 2 It is this author’s position that answers to the
latter depend on answers to the former and therefore corporate governance must include
both. Essentially, corporate governance asks and attempts to answer four questions:
what is the entity being governed?3 By whom it should be governed? What is the best
way to govern it? And in whose interests should the entity be governed? The
shareholder-stakeholder debate is one way of framing these problems and providing a
series answers.

The shareholder-stakeholder debate itself can be analyzed along a number of different
lines. At a most basic level it can be analysed as a discussion between monotonic and
pluralistic approaches to corporations—is the corporation a vehicle for shareholder
wealth or an instrument of a broader societal constituency?4 It can be analyzed along
cultural lines as in Anglo vs. Continental vs. Asian models.5 It can be analyzed along the
2

S. Bottomley “From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate Governance”

(1997) Sydney LR at p. 277 (hereinafter From Contractualism).
3

Assuming for the moment, contrary to nexus of contract theorists, that there is an entity to be governed.

4

T. Dunfee, “Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality,” 62 Law and Contemporary Problems,

Duke University Law School, 129-158, Summer, 1999.
5

See for example, A. Kakabadse and N. Kakabadse, The Geopolitics of Governance: The Impact of

Contrasting Philosophies. Basingstoke: Pagrave, 2001. Path dependence theories cited by J. Hill,
“Introduction: Comparative Corporate Governance and Takeovers” Sydney LR Vol. 24:319, p. 320, n. 7.
See L. Bebchuk and M. Roe “A Theory of Path Convergence in corporate ownership and governance”
(Nov. 1999) 52 Stanford Law Review il, p. 127, Farrar, CG p. 7, n. 2 and Chap. 2 generally. A. Corfield,
“The Stakeholder Theory and its Future in Australian Corporate Governance: A Preliminary Analysis.”
(1998) 10 Bond LR at p. 232, A. Gamble and G. Kelly, “Stakeholder Capitalism: Limits and

3

lines of business management vs. legal obligations.6 It can be analyzed with a number of
insider and outsider models. One such model is as members of the corporate entity vs.
non-members.7 Another insider-outsider model sets the question as corporation vs.
community.8 Still further, the stakeholder debate can be analyzed along the lines of
economic thinking.9

The shareholder-stakeholder debate in corporate governance has been going on for
decades increasing in pitch as globalization has increased10 and corporate scandals of

Opportunities.” At p. 7. For the contrary view, that corporate governance is converging and essentially
over, see H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman “The End of History for Corporate Law”, (2000) New York
University Centre for Law and Business, Working Paper #CLB-99-013 and Farrar’s second last line in CG
“This is not the end of history of corporate governance.” P. 472

7

C. Mayer, “Stock Markets: Financial Institutions and Corporate Performance” , in N. Dimsdale and M.

Preveser (eds). Capital Markets and Corporate “Governance. Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1994), p. 179 cited
in Farrar, CG, p. 417.
8

D. Korten. When Corporations Rule the World, 2 ed. New York: Kumarian Press. (2001), J. Dine, The

Governance of Corporate Groups. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2000) (hereinafter GCG)
Chap. 4., C. Weir, D. Laing and P. McKnight. “Internal and External Governance Mechanisms: Their
Impact on the Performance of Large UK Public Companies.” (June/July 2002) Journal of Business Finance
& Accounting 29(5) & (6).
9

R. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” (1937) 4 Economia (NS) 386.

10

See for example, Korten op cit. n. 6.
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ever increasing size rock the not only the investment community, but society at large.11
For some it is the critical debate as will be seen below,12 while others dismiss it a
“bogus”.13 This paper will analyze the debate, particularly looking at the legal arguments
and assumptions behind the positions taken by the two camps, the models of corporations
involved, normative issues corporate law and the implications for corporate governance.

HISTORY OF THE SHAREHOLDER-STAKEHOLDER
DEBATE

The debate can be traced back to Berle and Dodd’s articles in the Harvard Law Review of
the 1930’s. The debate took place against the backdrop of the 1929 stockmarket crash
11

“These reexaminations are usually triggered by a dramatic event or series of events and are initiated by

some of those involved in the events whose interests in dealing with those events would be served by
changing the rules. And generally others involved in those events see their interests served by preserving
the rules that have historically guided people.” A. Sommer, “Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The
Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later,” (Winter 1991) 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 33, p. 33. See public
calls for and efforts to improve corporate governance in post-Enron times such as Sorbanes-Oxley Act in
the USA.
12

Millon sees it as a “crisis” in corporate law. P. 1377 Dine citing Sullivan and Conlon who refer to a

change from contract to constituency models—i.e. shareholder to stakeholder—of corporations as having
“created a crisis in corporate governance.” GCG, p. 35.
13

P. Goldenberg, “Shareholders v Stakeholders: the Bogus Argument” (1998), 19 (2) Company Lawyer 34,

p. 36 cited in A. Reynolds, “Do ESOPS Strengthen Employee Stakeholder Interests?” (2001) 13 Bond LR
p. 97, n. 18.

5

which prompted a deep suspicion in Americans about the corporations in their midst.14
Berle took the view that managers only need consider the views of shareholders. Dodd
took the view that although the law supported Berle’s view, the concerns of workers
should be included.15 The debate has gone in both directions at different times in the
intervening years16 and as will be seen below continues to the present.17
14

Sommer, op cit at p. 36.

15

“Professor Dodd said that: [this writer] believes that public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has

made and is today making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an
economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit--making function, that this view has
already had some effect upon legal theory, and that it is likely to have a greatly increased effect upon the
latter in the near future. In response, Professor Berle said: "Now I submit that you can not [sic] abandon
emphasis on 'the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their
stockholders' until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of
responsibilities to someone else." Professor Berle finished his analysis with this summary: Unchecked by
present legal balances, a social--economic absolutism of corporate administrators, even if benevolent,
might be unsafe; and in any case it hardly affords the soundest base on which to construct the economic
commonwealth which industrialism seems to require. Meanwhile, as lawyers, we had best be protecting the
interests we know, being no less swift to provide for the new interests as they successively appear.” Quoted
in ibid, p. 37.
Generally, see J. Weiner, “The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation” (1964) 64
Columbia Law Review 1458. cited in Reynolds, op cit at p. 96.
16

Berle conceded that Dodd was gaining a greater following in his book, The 20th Century Capitalist

Revolution, 1954, cited in L. Stout “Bad and not-so-bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy” (2002)
Southern Calif. LR (75) 1189, at p. 1193.; however, W. Beaver’s article laments that it seems stakeholder
theory is finished. “Is the Stakeholder model dead?” (March-Apr. 1999) Business Horizons, 42 (12) p. 8.
17

Brief outline of the debate offered in D. Millon, “Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in

Corporate Law,” (1993) 50 Washington and Lee LR 1373 (hereinafter Communitarians). The triumphalist

6

One fundamental issue is who should be included as a stakeholder? At one end of the
spectrum are some scholars (and investors) who argue that the only stakeholder to be
considered is the shareholder. At the other end of the spectrum are those scholars who
would include even the most inanimate objects in the physical environment.18 One
generally accepted definition of stakeholder is R. Freeman’s who wrote: “A stakeholder
is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the

rhetoric of the shareholder primacy theorists is surprising. Consider, for example, the statement by
commentators Hansmann and Kraakman:
The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is
now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago. Logic alone did not
establish the superiority of this standard model or of the prescriptive rules that it implies, which
establish a strong corporate management with duties to serve the interests of shareholders alone,
and strong minority shareholder protections. Rather, the standard model earned its position as the
dominant model of the large corporation the hard way, by out-competing during the post-WorldWar-II period the three alternative models of corporate governance: the managerialist model, the
labor-oriented model, and the state-oriented model.
This rhetoric is reiterated by Jensen and others and is hard to explain given the lack of consensus among
economists, legal, and business scholars on the issue. By way of contrast note Millon’s observation “ The
longstanding shareholder primacy norm is on very shaky ground, Communitarians, p. 1376. Probably the
best analysis of the situation is Millon’s comment “our society never has committed itself, and never will,
to relentless shareholder wealth maximization and its attendant social costs” and that “neither position is on
the verge of triumph.” Ibid.
18

E. Sternberg, “The Defects of Stakeholder Theory,” Corp. Gov. Vol 5(1) p. 4.
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organization’s objectives.”19 In essence then the stakeholder model suggests that a
corporation should be governed by the people affected by the acts and decisions of the
corporation and this will be the meaning for proposes of this paper.

These positions of shareholder and stakeholder reflect a number of different concerns.
Scholars and business interests who favour the shareholder to the exclusion of all other
stakeholder are “minimalist pure stakeholder”20 and whose belief in the Market and
Adam Smith’s21 “Invisible Hand” is nearly religious.22 At the other extreme are scholars
probably merit the supposedly pejorative epithet the pure capitalists hurl: “communist”.

The stakeholder debate is further complicated by the stake in question. Is it a matter of
control, of voice, or merely being taken into consideration? As business professor Gerald
Vinten notes: “There is no such thing as a tradeable stakeholding certificate, and neither
is there any direct legal requirement [to consider stakeholders].”23 Yet the lack of
consensus on the stake in question certainly makes for a more muddled debate.
19

Ibid., p. 31.

20

D. Wood, “Whom should business serve?” (2002) 14 Aust. J. of Corp. Law commenting on Bruce

Langtry’s theory.
21

It is well known among scholars that Smith only refers to the invisible hand once in his The Wealth of

Nations and it more moderate in his views than commonly presented by neoliberals. Wood, op cit p. 2, n. 3.
22

See Harvard theologian, H. Cox’s article, “The Market as God”, (March 1999) Atlantic Monthly, p. 18-

23, J. Dine’s discussion of Cooter’s analysis of Coase Theorem, GCG, p. 111-113 and L. McQuaig. All
You Can Eat, (2001) Toronto: Penguin Books, discussion of the new capitalists view of Smith’s theories,
pp. 241-2.
23

Vinten, “The Stakeholder Manager,” (2000) 38 Management Decision (6) 377.

8

Yet another dimension to the debate is introduced by economists who approach the
debate from the perspective of efficiency some have challenged stakeholder theory on the
basis that stakeholder laws or “constituency states” such as anti-takeover legislation and
non-exclusive wealth maximizing create distortions in the market harming the efficiency
of the market and reducing overall social wealth and hence the overall well-being of
society.24 Other economists claim that stakeholder theory more accurately reflects the
situation by having internalized more costs which current accounting principles
inappropriately externalize.25

Another aspect to the debate is introduced when one examines the nature of the
corporation and its consequent role in society. Is the corporation merely a legal
recognition afforded to a natural aggregation of business people, or is it a concession
granted by government for the public good? The former position is advocated by
economists who as we shall see discuss the corporation in a nexus-of-contracts model.26
Lawyers, environmentalists and business ethicists among others looking at corporate
legal history as a way of supporting broader social responsibility, advocate the latter

24

See M. Jensen, “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function: (2001)

7 European Financial Management (3) 297, for example.
25

B. Horrigan “Fault Lines in the Intersection between Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility,”

UNSW LJ Vol 25(2), p. 515 and D. Wood, “Whom Should Business Serve?” (2002) 14 Australian Journal
of Corporate Law 1-20.
26

This concept was pioneered by Coase “Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economia NS 386 cited in Farrar

CG p. 30, n. 69.
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position. The legal aspect of the debate becomes more complex as one examines various
legal concepts of corporate law arising from rulings such as Salomon v. Salomon & Co.
Ltd.27 and even more so when one examines the normative issues of corporate law.

Still further, the discussion takes on a different dimension when one examines the views
of management theorists and practitioners who are concerned about the practical matters
of profitability, accountability, and control. These interests and concerns are intertwined
with some of the interests and concerns of corporate lawyers. The discussion in this area
considers among other things, the best way to control the corporation, and generally
frames the discussion in terms of internal or external forms of regulation.28

In dealing with the shareholder- stakeholder debate, yet another discussion comes into
play. That is: what is the role of government in dealing with corporations and the various
interests they represent? Is it to facilitate the market and the Invisible Hand as
shareholders advocate, or is it to regulate corporations to promote the common good as
stakeholders would have it?

27

[1897] AC 22, Farrar CG p. 28.

28

See for example, J. Dine, GCG, Chap. 4 “Theories and models of the regulation of corporations and

groups.”
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Clearly, the stakeholder debate is multi-faceted, multi-disciplinary, interconnected and in
some aspects circular.29 Government, as the ultimate external control, needs direction
from the public and from scholars on the nature, purpose and functioning of the
corporation in order to develop appropriate systems to do its job of governing the nation.
The role of government is made more complex by the influence of corporations, and of
course, the debate on the proper role of government in the first place.

STAKEHOLDER THEORY
Stakeholder Theory-Origins and History

As a previously noted, as a legal concern, stakeholder theory goes back to Dodd;
however, stakeholder theory as a management concern can be traced back at least to 1963
where it was used by the Stanford Research Institute in an internal memorandum on
management to signify “those groups without whose support the organization would
cease to exist.”30

Stakeholder theory answers the four questions as follows. (1) The corporation is a

29

In this paper the author will not distinguish between the various particularities of corporate law in Anglo

jurisdictions because the fundamental concerns and issues are the same: the nature of the corporation and
its role in society.
30

R.E Freeman, Strategic Planning: a Stakeholder Approach. New York, Pitman Publishing, (1984), p. 32.
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concession from the government and an independent entity in itself. (2) It should be
governed by those affected by the decisions and actions of the corporation. (3) The best
way to govern the corporation is by having decision making structures in place that
permit those effected by the decisions at least voice, if not some control on the decisions
made. And (4) the corporation should be governed in a way that promotes overall social
good.

Stakeholder Theory – Assumptions And Criticism
Assumptions
Stakeholder theory fundamentally holds that the corporation is an entity that has profound
effects on society. On that basis those affected should have some confluence or control
over the corporation. It is based on fundamental legal principles and beliefs such as that
one must bear responsibility for consequences of action, that economics and efficiency
are not ultimate values, and voice in the distribution of cost and benefits of society
resources.31

Criticism
Perhaps the champion of stakeholder critics is Elaine Sternberg.32 As the leading
spokesperson opposing stakeholder theory, her arguments merit analysis.

31

Referred to by Stokes as the democratic ideal, cited in Bottomley, From Contractarian op cit, p. 290

32

M. Jensen, at p. 298, n. 2. Sternberg is a former investment banker turned philosopher. She includes in

her argument certain legal grounds for opposing stakeholder theory. That she views stakeholder theory as
some type of heretical cult as can be seen from the title of her article “Stakeholder Theory Exposed”. It is
interesting to note that few lawyers seem to oppose stakeholder theory—at least not on legal grounds.
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Sternberg’s criticism of stakeholder theory has four main thrusts.33 She argues:
stakeholder theory is incompatible with business, stakeholder theory is incompatible with
corporate governance, stakeholder theory of accountability is unjustified, and stakeholder
theory undermines private property, agency and wealth.

Sternberg holds “stakeholder theory… wholly precludes the activity of business.” She
argues that business requires maximizing long-term owner value. In contrast the
balancing requirement of stakeholder theory precludes such favouritism that by definition
obviates business. She furthers her argument by claiming stakeholder theory is
unworkable because the number of stakeholders is infinite and given all the competing
interests the identification of what should be counted as a benefit is not identifiable. She
further argues that as stakeholder theory has no means of weighing or balancing the
competing interests of various stakeholders this balancing task is impossible. In essence
this argument challenges the nature and purpose of corporations.

Sternberg next argues that stakeholder theory is incompatible with corporate governance.
In her view, accountability of directors to shareholders is the central issue in corporate

Perhaps this reflects an understanding that the law does not exist a priori, but follows from determined
policy decisions, or alternatively, that law does have an inherent obligation of social justice.
33

E. Sternberg, op cit. Criticisms of stakeholder theory are generally variations on these same themes,

whether the criticisms arise from legal scholars, economists, business theorists or others. See for example,
the paper by finance professor A. Sundaram and professor of management and strategy, A. Inkpen, “The
Corporate Objective Revisited”, p. 20-21 unpublished paper available on Social Science Research Network
at www.ssrn.com .
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governance. In contrast she notes: “an essential principle of stakeholder theory [is] that
corporations should be equally accountable to all their stakeholders. [italics in
original]”34 She attacks this position as “unjustified” and “unworkable.” Clearly, if one
accepts her view of accountability and corporate governance, she is correct.

Concerning her third argument on accountability, Sternberg argues that stakeholder
theory “gives full rein to arrogant and unresponsive management” and assists in
exploitation of corporations by management by failing to provide a single clear criterion
for judgment of performance. She claims it requires management to reject the obligations
to owners that they accepted in accepting their management jobs. Sternberg argues: “As
the property of its owners, a business is properly accountable only to them.”35

Finally, Sternberg claims that stakeholder theory undermines private property rights by
denying owners of private property the right to deal with it as they choose. If
corporations for any reason act in the interests of anyone but the shareholders,
corporations are converting and/or curtailing the private property rights of the owners.
As Millon observes:
[stakeholder theorists] characterize the debate as a disagreement over whether it is
appropriate to use mandatory rules to impeded shareholder wealth maximization
in order to benefit other corporate constituent groups or other affected interests
outside the corporate enterprise. For contractarians [shareholder theorists], such
rules represent an unjust imposition on the liberty of shareholder to pursue their
own interests. They have made this point by criticizing communitarian
34

Ibid, p. 5.

35

Ibid, p. 6. Sternberg also briefly addresses corporate performance, Kantian moral theory, parallels with

government, and social contract arguments for extra-corporate accountability.
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[stakeholder] corporate law reform as the reallocation of wealth from shareholders
to nonshareholders.36

Sternberg applies this same analysis to the law of principal and agent. Again, Sternberg
holds that the directors and managers of corporations are agents of the shareholders.
Accordingly, stakeholder theory, which allows the former to act independently of or
contrary to the wishes of shareholders it undermines the duty of the agent to the
principal.37

She argues that these two pillars of law underlie the success of western economies and
political liberties and accordingly should be protected by rejecting absolutely stakeholder
theory. Sternberg’s argument is that the law as it stands in support of capitalist, free
market economies is correct and should be carefully guarded.

Sternberg concludes her attack on stakeholder theory with ad hominem arguments that
seem to characterize opponents of stakeholder theory.38 She opines: “stakeholder theory
36

Millon, Communitarians, at p. 1383-4.

37

Indeed, as a Sommer observes: “it may be reasonably concluded that the legislature intended to do

something common law did not do in affording directors flexibility in fending off a hostile tender offer –
namely, favor non--shareholders over shareholders.” Op cit p. 43
38

See, for example, Jensen, op. cit. p. 306 who writes “Stakeholder theory gives them [socialists] the

appearance of legitimate political access to the sources of decision making power.” This personalizing of
the debate is addressed by Millon who observes: “The ideology and psychological predispositions that turn
many corporate law scholars away from these kinds of inquires explain the inability of at least some
contractarians to acknowledge the crisis in corporate law,” Communitarians at p. 1388, in reference to the
need to address social concerns in corporate law.
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seems to offer a free lunch; it attracts those would like to enjoy the benefits of business
without the discipline… [and] those with most to gain from avoiding accountability:
business managers…. [and] promoters of worthy ‘causes’, who believe they would be the
beneficiaries.”39 Perhaps this type of personal and emotional attack reflects the very deep
and personal ideologies that underlie the debate, which shall be addressed later in this
paper.

Sternberg’s argument is that stakeholder theory is fundamentally flawed because it does
not make directors responsible to owners. This is the classic Berle and Means agency
problem. Her concern is that the agents will act exclusively in their own self-interest. As
Sternberg sees it, directors cannot be or have any true accountability unless it is directly
and exclusively to shareholder. Empirical studies of self-interest in management action
and decision making suggest that Sternberg is being driven by ideology more than
evidence. Studies indicate that managerial motivation is far more complex including
aspects of altruistically motivated behaviour along with self-interested behaviour.

Sternberg’s criticisms are by no means an exhaustive list of the criticisms of stakeholder
theory; however they are both representative of general issues and address the main
concerns.40

39

Ibid. pp. 8-9.

40

See for e.g. Sundaram and Inkfield who identify five and Corfield who identifies eight. These criticisms

are broadly addressed by the four raised by Sternberg.
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Replies To Stakeholder Criticism41

Stakeholder critics have some trenchant criticisms of the theory. The strength of these
criticisms revolves primarily around the above noted issues of accountability and
currently existing legal norms. We shall now turn our attention to individual replies to
each of these criticisms. First, is it correct to say that stakeholder theory is contrary to
business?

For stakeholder theory to be against business, one must accept a certain definition of
business, and more particularly, a certain theory of the corporation. If the corporation is,
as economists argue, a nexus-of-contracts, then there may be some credence to the
argument. But one must further accept that the appropriate and exclusive object of
business is the increase of wealth for the owners of the business. In addition, one must
also exclude the wealth of any other party including the general social benefit as being of
interest or importance.42 Furthermore, as will be discussed in greater depth, it is not at all
clear that long-term stockholder interest should have priority over short-term stockholder
41

For a business reply to Sternberg’s four objections, see G. Vinten, op cit.

42

Later in this paper we will take up the challenge that the increasingly unequal distribution of wealth

creates for those who argue that overall wealth increases the social wealth of a country. See, for example,
Jenson, p. 302-304, and the contrary views by S. Bottomley, “Taking Corporations Seriously: Some
Considerations for Corporate Regulation” in (1990) 19 Federal Law Review, pl. 204, and R. Dworkin, “Is
Wealth a Value?” in (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies, p. 191, cited by J. Dine “Risks and Systems: A New
Approach to Corporate Governance and the European Employee Consultation Structures?” (2001) 3
International and Comp. Corp. LJ 2 p. 302, n. 11.
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interest, nor yet that shareholder are “owners” and have a unique or special position in
the corporation

Clearly, these assumptions are suspect. Farrar, for example, laments about “the
unsatisfactory state of affairs” in his authoritative analysis of the corporation,43 H.L.A.
Hart observes that none of the theories of the corporation adequately explain the
phenomenon.44 Theories of the corporations include sociological, economic, and legal.
One can further analyze the corporation in terms of culture, power, politics and
cybernetics.45 Farrar outlines the mutations of the idea of the corporation and its
purposes over time and states that this too adds to the uncertainty in the proper
identification of the nature and purposes of the corporation.46 Accordingly, without any
consensus concerning a foundational understanding of the corporation or its purpose, it is
difficult to see how Sternberg’s criticism can stand. Stakeholder theory is merely outside
of Sternberg’s paradigm for the corporation.

43

J. Farrar, “Frankenstein Incorporated or Fool’s Parliament? Revisiting the Concept of the Corporation in

Corporate Governance” (1998) 10 Bond LR at p. 161 (hereinafter Frankenstein).
44

E. Orts “The Complexity And Legitimacy Of Corporate Law” (Fall, 1993) 50 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1565

p. 1623 P. 3
45

See for example the discussion in Turnbull, op cit, pp. 193-196

46

Ibid, pp. 144-45.
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Sternberg’s next criticism, that stakeholder theory is contrary to corporate governance is
based on the issue of accountability. 47 To be equally accountable to all she argues is to
be accountable to none. This argument is a straw-man argument. Stakeholder theory, to
the extent that one can speak of unanimity of views, does not advocate equality of all
interests—or the view this extreme position implies: the rejection of the profit motive.48
Judges daily and legislatures regularly balance conflicting interests examining by policy
objectives among other things.49

In fact as noted by Prof. Henry Hu corporate directors already do just that.50 These
answers, however, are not to denigrate the seriousness of the criticism. Stakeholder
theory does have a considerable challenge to address when it comes to the issues of how
and to whom the corporation should be accountable. Alternative answers lie in corporate
governance structures in non-Anglo corporations. For example, the German two tiered
board that permits employees a strong voice in decision-making, or the Japanese model
that permits a tripartite objective for the corporation.51 Other more Anglo solutions lie as

47

Jensen ibid argues that from a management perspective, stakeholder theory is impossible because it

requires management to consider more than one interest. P. 300 ff.
48

Dunfee op. cit, n. 2 at p. 131.

49

See, for example, Richard Posner’s life work on economics as the policy driving law.

50

H. Hu, “Risk, Time and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment”, (1994) 38 UCLA L. Rev. 277

cited in Orts, op cit.
51

Noted in Horrigan, op cit at p. 542 writes “Japanese communitarian capitalism… [has] three intertwined

strands of the common good—i.e. the pursuit of happiness and prosperity, the concern for justice and
fairness, and the affirmation and importance of community.”

19

Horrigan also notes in the “Triple Bottom Line” idea—i.e. profit, environmental
protection and social good—which seems to be gaining some acceptance, at least in
Australia.52

The must fundamental legal challenge to stakeholder theory comes from Sternberg’s
criticisms concerning of property and agency law. This criticism goes back to the Berle
and Dodd debate in which Berle cautioned against stakeholder view: “it requires little
analysis to make place the fact that private property as understood in the capitalist system
is rapidly losing its original characteristics.”53 If one accepts, however, that all rights
except the right to life,54 are circumscribed, that no rights are absolute, then there is no
reason the right to private property should be any different. The law does in fact
recognize many limitations on private property rights. For example, the law recognizes
the state’s right to appropriate land, or to prohibit the ownership of another human being,
and where and how one may drive one’s car. Furthermore, if one accepts that the
corporation is not the property of stakeholder but an independent entity in which
stakeholder have but three rights, voting, dividends and residue, the criticism from
property and agency law do not stand. Sternberg’s view of law is a naïve view of law.
She appears to presume that law in some manner is a priori and has followed a logical
non-ideological path. It is generally recognized that law is the product of its particular
52
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times,55 certain styles of thinking, by a limited group of people, usually a propertied,
privileged class with less concern for those without.56

SHAREHOLDER THEORY

To avoid a straw-man argument, as Sternberg created in her criticism of stakeholder
theory, the discussion of “shareholder theory” must start with a caveat. In all but its most
extreme versions, shareholder theory does not require that every other party be ignored
and every possible action to advance profit be acted.57 Rather, it requires that primacy be
given to the shareholder, and accordingly in the USA legal literature at least, is referred
to as “shareholder primacy.” Shareholder primacy sees the corporation’s objective as
maximizing shareholder wealth. Business scholars refer to this wealth maximization as
the “corporate objective function.”58 Although shareholders can be viewed or
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characterized in a number of different ways,59 for purposes of this debate, the view that
most accurately represents the situation under discussion is the shareholder-as-investor
view.

Shareholder theorists answer the four questions of corporate governance as follows. (1)
There is no entity to be governed: it is a mere collection of contracts the terms of which
govern the actions of the individuals involved. (2) Given the separation of owners from
mangers, it should be governed by shareholder appointees—directors. (3) The best way
to govern the corporation is by a board of directors elected by and accountable to the
shareholders. And (4) the corporation should be governed for shareholder wealth
maximization.

Shareholder Theory--Origins and History

From the perspective of legal theory, one could argue that historically the primacy of
shareholder rights arises from doctrines of private property. John Locke argued that
private property is carved out of the common property by the labour a person puts into it:

59
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“It hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right.”60 In
other words, by the direct connection of one’s hands and the physical article one had an
ownership right—the right to exclusive use.61 As Mr. Justice Wilson wrote in the 1766
property case concerning landowners denial of gleaning rights to commoners: “the soil is
his, the seed is his and in natural justice his also is the profit.”62 This view of private
property rights lent credence to the argument that the rights of ownership of capital led to
rights to manage the enterprise. This view provided a stronger argument at a time when
capital and management were more closely linked.63 In corporate law, one finds that the
shareholders were historically those who invested their private property, money, into a
common fund such as a joint stock company with a view to a profit.64

Changes in corporate law, however, increased the separation between owners of
financial capital and in the income generating assets of the business. In the USA with
Santa Clara County vs. South Pacific Railroad 65 and in the UK with Salomon vs.
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Salomon & Co. Ltd.66 the courts gave the corporation an independent personality. This
personality existed and held property and liability in this own right with complete
independence from the shareholders and other members of the corporate entity. This
change in the law permitted management to ignore the broader concerns of the general
commercial environment, which would include such parties as creditors and employees,
and to the narrow focus on the interests of the “owner” shareholders.67

Prior to these court decisions, corporations did not have independent legal personality,
and hence were not able to sustain a legal action independently of the shareholders. Nor
was limited liability a feature of corporations until 1855.68 With the combined benefits of
independent legal personality and limited liability, it was no longer necessary for
shareholders to consider any other interests. There was no greater personal financial risk
in refusing to consider other interests than the risk already accepted by making the
investment in the corporation in the first place. As a result, people could become
investors, carefree of corporate action and its consequences, except for return on
capital.69 While this phenomena is neither new nor unexpected—it was anticipated by
Smith and Marx70—it carries with it certain problems, and particularly the agency
problem, and for some, a moral problem.71 As Wood notes:
66
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Berle and Means point out that having ‘surrendered control and responsibility’
over corporate assets, shareholders had ‘surrendered the right that the corporation
should be operated in their sole interest’ and ‘released the community from the
obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the strict doctrine of
property rights’.72
Over time, corporate law came to reflect this single focal point73 and increased the focus
on director accountability to shareholders. Hill argues that the trade-off of control was
made at the same time that the courts moved the focus of corporate law to the
maximization of shareholder wealth.74 In other words, the agency problem that was
created by the separation of ownership and management was at the same time resolved by
the fiduciary nature of the duties placed on management.75

Although shareholder primacy was developed by USA courts in the 1830’s in terms of
receiving of dividends and voting,76 the view of shareholder wealth being the focus of the
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corporate enterprise was pronounced by the courts in 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co.77 As stated in that case, “A business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end.” Managers have followed that lead78 and generally welcomed this
focus as it simplified their responsibility and tied their success to clearly and easily
measurable outcomes.79 In regulating corporations more recently, however, some
governments have opened the earlier narrow laws that precluded non-shareholder
interests.80 In doing so, the hope was that corporations and specifically directors would
consider other interests of the broader community or social development concerns.81
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As such, pursuit of non-shareholder interests—i.e. stakeholder interests—in the
shareholder view amounts to a tax or misuse of the private property of the shareholders.82
In summary the main idea here is that as the parties who put up the money for the
enterprise, the shareholders should have the right to be the sole concern of and have the
right to control the enterprise. From the management perspective, current proponents of
shareholder primacy, such as Jensen, argue, “value maximization says that managers
should make all decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of the firm.”83

The other main argument for shareholder primacy comes from the legal foundation of the
corporation. Corporations are founded by one or more people contributing a fund of
capital for the purpose of carrying on a business with a view to making a profit. These
founding contributors are the shareholders. As founders of an entity, the corporation,
shareholders have the right to control the entity.

Shareholder Theory – Assumptions And Criticism
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Most recently, shareholder primacy was brought into focus by the views of the
economist, Milton Friedman. In his highly controversial article, “The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits”84 Friedman argued that the social
good achieved by a corporation is to producing a profit.85 He wrote: “the one and only
one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities
designed to increase its profits so long as it… engages in open and free competition,
without deception or fraud.”86 And, “Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the
very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social
responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible.”87
Friedman and other profit maximization theorists88 make social welfare the ultimate
justification for the exclusive focus on profit. In other words, the good end—social
benefit—will be achieved by ignoring it and in fact focusing exclusively on another
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end—shareholder wealth maximization.89

As Hansmann and Kraakman, the authors of

the influential “The End of History for Corporate Law” write:
The point is simply that now, as a consequence of both logic and experience, there
is a convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end—the pursuit of
aggregate social welfare—is to make corporate mangers strongly accountable to
shareholder interests, and… only to those interests.90
This social benefit therefore becomes the justification for shareholder primacy.

It should be asked, therefore, whether this has in fact occurred. Economic studies do not
support this contention. What can be said is that in the United States as shareholder
primacy has advanced over the last 30 years is that there has been an increased
concentration of wealth. One finds a growing disparity between rich and poor and
decline in the wealth of the middle class.91 Indeed, World Bank and IMF92 structural
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adjustment programs, an integral part of which have been to open borders to shareholder
primacy corporations, have been a failure in increasing general social wealth or widely
distributing the benefits of corporate activity.93 The activities of these transnational
corporations seem to do the opposite: they increase the concentration of wealth and
increase the disparity between the rich and the poor.94 Accordingly, shareholder primacy
as a general principal or a specific mechanism cannot be supported on the basis that it
benefits society overall.

Four further reasons, however, are advocated by contemporary law and economics
scholars. Hill notes that these scholars claim that shareholders should have primacy
because: (1) they hold the residual claims, (2) have the greatest risk, (3) the greatest
incentive to maximize firm value and (4) the least protection.95 In her analysis of
corporate finance, however, we find a very different reality to which we will now turn.

As to the first claim, concerning the residual claim, L. Stout observes that, the only time
shareholders actually have the actual residual claim is when the corporation is in
bankruptcy or being wound-up.96 Accordingly, to argue that shareholders deserve to
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have their interests as the foremost consideration on the basis of their right to the residual
claim is hardly compelling.97

The second argument concerning risk is also challengeable. With respect to publicly
traded corporations there is a highly liquid market for shares and at practically any point,
should the shareholder deem the risk unacceptable, the shareholdings can easily be sold.
Furthermore, in contrast to other stakeholders, such as employees who for example bear
the risk of unemployment and who lack the their general in ability to “withdraw their
investment”, shareholders appear to have a lesser risk.98

Furthermore, shareholder primacy advocates argue the risk shareholders take as equity
investors is significantly different and greater than other capital providers. This argument
is premised on a clear distinction between debt and equity. Hill demonstrates, that this
distinction in contemporary corporations is very hard to maintain. She writes: “with the
rise of more complex funding instruments the traditional distinction between debt and
equity fails to accord with economic reality and looks artificial, arbitrary and increasingly
passé.”99 She notes that the disaggregation of equity investments, dividing the risk and
control components, makes the notion of shareholder as risk bearer and residual claimant
97
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much less compelling. In fact, Hill argues, at times the courts are more likely to consider
the interests of other financiers ahead of shareholders—the corporation’s success or
failure being a thing independent of any particular interest group.100

Hill also notes the long term involvement of some lenders who end up having much more
at stake than shareholders who can easily exit a precarious financial situation. She notes
the controlling positions some of these lenders take, not only in securing their funds, but
also in the operations of the corporations becoming more like insiders than the traditional
outsider role of creditors. This situation, which she argues is the corporate reality, does
not jibe with the shareholder primacy model advocated by shareholder primacy
theorists.101 The point is pressed further by Stout who notes that even in a closely held
corporation, once the corporation has assumed debt, the creditor has a greater right of
“ownership” to the cash flow of the corporation than the shareholder.102 It is fair to say
therefore, shareholders are merely one group of financiers whose characteristics do not fit
the description set out by the law and economics scholars.103
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The third argument supporting shareholder primacy on the basis that they have the
greatest incentive to see the corporation profit suffers its own weakness. While
shareholders may be eager to see the value of the corporation maximized there are
certainly others with the same interest. These would include such groups as employees
seeking job security, directors and managers whose income may be directly tried to this
measure, (and who lack the diversified portfolio common to shareholders) have a grater
interest in seeing maximization than shareholders. Further, this position ignores the
diversity among shareholder interest, and in particular such parties as those parties taking
a short position on the shares.

Furthermore, profit and wealth are arbitrary abstractions that hold no innate value
commanding a privileged position. As Wood observes:
there is no ‘prima facie’ moral, as opposed to prudential, reason, why profit
should be promoted, let alone maximized. Profit is a mere accounting concept,
and profit-maximisation is at most a highly artificial goal. Profit is certainly not in
its own right a ‘morally important social value’ such as: ‘the protection of the
environment, the advancement of knowledge, the development of culture, the
promotion of social prosperity, the fostering of community, and the protection of
public health.’
Again, one is turned to the objective of shareholder wealth maximization as the objective
of corporate activity, and when contrasted with other valuable objectives, the shareholder
primacy model comes up lacking.104
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Further, this argument assumes an alignment of corporate interests and shareholder
interests, as well as identifying corporate profit with shareholder wealth. As will be seen
later in the discussion, neither of these assumptions is tenable.

The fourth argument put forward for shareholder primacy is that they are in the most
vulnerable, least protected position. In addition to the replies to the previous three
arguments, which equally apply to this contention, it is simply not the case. Shareholders
have the option of choosing to invest in whichever form of contract they believe suits
their specific acceptable combination of risk and reward. In addition, shareholders are
granted several special remedies at law, such as derivative actions and winding-up the
company on just and equitable grounds, denied to other stakeholders.105 Finally, as a
previously noted, in a stock market with much liquidity, there is always the exit option.

The shareholder primacy model has a number of other fundamental problems to which
we will now turn. Shareholder primacy focuses on wealth maximization. This leads to
the question, what is wealth maximization? Is it shareholder wealth, or is it corporate
profit? In a groundbreaking study, Professor Hu has identified a significant difference
between shareholder gain and corporate profit and particularly, that the one does not

corporate profitability other than wish for it. “To Whom it May Concern: Fiduciary Duties and Business
Associations,” (2001) 26 Del. J. Corp. L 515.
105
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necessarily lead to the other.106 This fact creates a problem for managers who on the one
hand seek job security by having employment with a wealthy corporation while on the
other hand remaining answerable to shareholders seeking their own wealth.107

In addition, Hu has identified and analysed the myth of the common shareholder interest.
He notes a number of conflicts existing as between shareholders. For example,
shareholders disagree concerning the nature and amount of risk each wants the
management to take, they have different time lines—whether long term capital gain, or
speculators trying to take advantage of an acquisition announcement.108 This critique
leaves shareholder theorists subject to the same attack they level at stakeholders: there is
evidently more than one objective and managers cannot focus on more than one
objective. In this instance the objectives include corporate profit, shareholder wealth,
short-term shareholder interests, long term shareholder interests, high-risk shareholder
interests, and low risk shareholder interests, among others. Worse yet, the law has
neither denied nor validated one shareholder over the other.109 At this point, the law
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introduces yet another guidepost, namely, “the best interests of the corporation”110 which
tends to further confound the discussion.

But this brings us to the more fundamental question of why shareholders should have
their privileged position in the first place. Dine raises the question from the dynamic
aspect of the corporation. As noted previously, while shareholders are necessary to start
up or found the corporation and claim primacy on that basis, from an operational
perspective once the corporation is up and running, their role as founders loses
significance. This foundational argument is even more seriously challenged by the
practice among lawyers of having “shelf-companies”, companies organized and
registered for the purpose of rapid and easy deployment of a corporate vehicle in a
commercial transaction. Once the business corporation is operational, shareholders are
but one more source of capital, and in truth, the least preferred source of capital.111 From
an operational perspective therefore, shareholders really have no privileged position or
interest.112 In fact, were it not for their voting power, their existence would be but of
marginal interest.113 In a related vein, shareholder primacy theorists argue that because
shareholders are true insiders because they are founders. Hill’s study of corporations
raises serious questions about the insider-outsider model of the corporation, and
particularly, shareholder claims to primacy based on their special role as the ultimate
110
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insider. As previously noted from the perspective of corporate finance, Hill’s analysis
suggests that other traditional outsider financiers often play a much greater insider role
than shareholders.114 In addition, as we have seen the demarcation lines between debt
and equity have been sufficiently eroded to make it nearly impossible to ascribe one party
“insider rights” to denied to the other “outsiders “ on the basis of this debt-equity
distinction. Further on this insider-outsider theme it is difficult to see how such
employees should be outsiders without some determinative power over the direction of
the corporation while day-trading shareholders should be considered insiders with such
power. 115

Horrigan criticizes the shareholder primacy approach to capital. He observes that this
definition of capital in this model is too narrow or “monodimensional.” Corporate
enterprise as a type of human enterprise relies on “economic capital, human capital,
intellectual capital, social capital and environmental capital.”116 In reality, shareholders
are just one type of capital provider among a vast collection of providers including
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employees who provide human capital, creditors who provide debt capital, suppliers and
society that provides educated, assimilated workers.117

Returning to the property rights argument for shareholder primacy, Hill points out that
the early aggregate or partnership model of the corporation supported the view of
shareholders as “owners” of the enterprise, and hence their importance rested on the idea
that their interests are “distinct and inherently different” from other parties. But as we
have seen, the history of the corporation has moved it and the associated rights a
considerable distance from these roots. From a legal perspective 118 shareholders are not
“owners” of the corporation and accordingly, this argument fails. Further, as Stout
observes, options theory undermines at a most fundamental level the notion of
shareholder ownership.119

Replies to Shareholder Primacy Criticism and Further Criticism
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If, then, shareholders are not dominant in management, control or in terms of providing
finance, why should they continue to have the level of control they do? Why should they
have the vote?120

In essence, the shareholder primacy theory is based on assumptions of efficiency. With
one goal—wealth generation—managers will be clear on their objective and do what they
are able to do, best—generate wealth. It is less efficient to have the corporation involved
such other social concerns such as the just distribution of wealth, a takes for which it was
not designed. General social welfare is outside the scope of corporate concern.
Externalised costs are acceptable in the creation of wealth as they are of minimal concern
to non-shareholders, and where they do become of concern, it is the role and
responsibility of other societal organizations, such as government, to address them, or
these non-shareholders to contract for those harms.

The argument has been advanced that perhaps shareholders should enjoy these rights to
cause some general harm in the process of their wealth maximization on the basis that
they value them more than non-shareholders value the right not to be harmed. Millon
observes that at a factual level, non-shareholders tend to suffer more from shareholder
exploitation than shareholders would if they were not permitted the right.121 Further,

120

As noted earlier, Wood argues shareholders gave up these rights when they surrendered responsibility

for the corporation.
121

Millon, New Directions, p. 1384.

39

Millon questions why bargaining and bargaining power should be the basis of protection
from the harmful effects of shareholder wealth maximization.122

A further criticism of shareholder primacy comes from the nature of shareholders
themselves. Shareholders are by and large passive. As Hill observes, “[shareholders]
invest in the investment, not in the corporation.”123 They are not interested in building,
operating, or controlling the corporation. When problems in the corporation become
evident, shareholders prefer to exercise exit rights—the Wall Street walk—over working
to resolving the situation.124

There are as well some obvious factual arguments against shareholder primacy. Contrary
to their claim that the stakeholder corporations cannot function because of diverse
objectives, in many places the law has successfully and without undue diminution of
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wealth—shareholder or societal—integrated stakeholder theory. Whether one chooses to
look at European corporations with their two tiered boards, or employee, creditor,
environmental liabilities placed on directors in Anglo modelled corporations, one finds
that directors have successfully incorporated the conflicting concerns of their various
constituent stakeholders in the supposedly exclusive shareholder model.125 One study
indicates that managers understand the different objectives demanded by the difference
between shareholder value and traditional accounting have adapted their behaviour
accordingly.126

Further, shareholder primacy theorist tends to ignore empirical studies demonstrating the
success of stakeholder oriented corporations.127 In reality, even in the USA, arguably the
most shareholder primacy jurisdiction, the law permits considerable latitude to
management to deviate from shareholder primacy.128 Even among shareholder primacy
advocates themselves, one notes levels of deviation from shareholder primacy. Whether
one notes Friedman’s caveat restricting shareholder wealth maximization to “conforming
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to the basic rules of society”129, Jensen’s concern for “equity, creditors, warrant holders,”
or Hansmann and Kraakman, move away from pure shareholder interests granting
“creditors, to be sure, are to some degree an exception”130 (with no reason for the
exception), it suggests that shareholder supremacy is in some way unsatisfactory even to
its most outspoken advocates. It suggests that these advocates recognize, as others have
noted, that the corporation exists within society and relies on the social goods or capital
supplied by society.131

From the above discussion, it is clear that the debate is complex and difficult, if not
impossible, to resolve within the parameters of the debate itself. If one is to move
forward one must step outside the narrow confines of the debate and address directly the
ideological and technical considerations underlying the tensions. From an ideological
perspective, one compares the neoliberal economics focus on private property, antiregulatory stance with the social justice concerns of more socialist oriented scholars.132
129
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These two opposing stances translate into the discussion of nature and purpose of the
corporation and from whence, the nature and purpose of corporate law. It is from such an
understanding that the four questions of corporate governance can be answered.

MODELS OF THE CORPORATION AND THE DEBATE133

Models of the corporation are intimately connected to the debate. As we shall see, one
level the whole shareholder-stakeholder debate hinges on what one’s theory of the
corporation is. Models are both a starting point and a conclusion for the various
positions. Briefly, if one adopts the model of the corporation as a series of private
contracts between individuals, there can be no discussion about any interest but
shareholder interests. If, however, one adopts the model of the corporation as a
concession from society, then one may rightly claim corporate obligations back to
society. In this section we will briefly examine the various models of the corporation
and the significance of models for the debate.134 Broadly speaking, there are three main

Cambridge University Press. P.1 Malloy views the issue not as a tension between efficiency and social
justice. Rather, on the basis of the application of semiotic theory to the problem, Malloy frames the issues
as a dynamic between creativity and efficiency. Unfortunately, his set of solutions are beyond the scope of
this paper’s analysis of the traditional stakeholder-shareholder debate.
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for or against legal reform by reference to some kind of characterization of the corporate person. A
descriptive assertion (“the corporation is x”) is advanced on behalf of a normative claim (“therefore y
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models of the corporation. These are: concessionaire and contractarian which roughly
approximate the entity, social models for the former and the aggregational, property
models for the latter and—the third model of the corporation, the communitarian model,
will not be dealt with because it has largely been abandoned with the decline of state-run
corporations.135

Contractarian Theories136
In essence, contractarians view the corporation as a form of contract between
shareholders. This theory posits the corporation as a private matter between individuals
thus placing no additional duty on the corporation than that which exists on the separate
individuals involved in the corporation. The corporation as a private matter should be
subject to the least possible government interference. There are two types of
contractarians—legal and economic.137

should follow”). In this way, what might otherwise appear to be abstract, purely academic debates about
corporate legal theory in fact support controversial political agendas.” The Ambiguous, p. 2.
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Legal Contractarian Model
Legal contractarianism is the view that corporations arise when two or more people come
together, to form a legal contract to carry on commercial activity. From Bottomley’s
discussion, we may note three aspects of legal contractualism, relevant to this discussion.
First, it creates a legal entity in which directors and members are bound together in the
corporation’s articles of incorporation. Second, it defines the boundaries and
membership of the corporation.138 And third, it favours the overall interest of the
members over the interest of any individual.139 It is, to say the least an “unusual type” of
contract.140

The model’s weakness lies in interpretation of the corporation’s founding articles or
constitution. The “founding contract” is only enforceable by shareholders despite the fact
that other parties may be party to the contract and even then, shareholder legal remedies
are greatly restricted.

A further problem is that the model posits the interests of the founding contractors as
being identical to the corporate enterprise itself. As seen in the above discussion of the
theories of Professor Hu, this is simply not the case. Corporate interests differ from
shareholders' as do shareholders among themselves.
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As previously noted, Dine identifies the difficulty in applying this foundational model to
an operating company: once up and running, the rights and duties of the parties in a
corporation change—the shareholders no longer have the absolute rights they had when
founding the corporation, and in particular, their rights vis-à-vis directors are weakened.
As demonstrated in Foss v. Harbottle,141 the directors have independence from the
shareholders and a level of immunity from shareholders even should the directors take an
action contrary to the wishes of some shareholders. This suggests that the corporation is
more than a mere contract between shareholders.

Economic Contractarian Model
This model finds its origins with the economist Ronald Coase. Coase first proposed that
the corporation is a type of firm.142 By this Coase means that the firm operates as a more
efficient means of production by grouping people and inputs together, combining tasks in
one enterprise thereby lowering transaction costs.143 In this model, there is a direct
connection and related accountability between the capital provider-shareholders and the
managers. As Friedman puts it “He [an executive] has a direct responsibility to his
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employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance to their desire,
which generally will be to make as much money as possible.”144

Contractarians reject the notion of the corporation being a body independent of the
shareholders and in fact reject the very idea of corporation. It is merely a nexus of
contracts. Logically, it cannot have obligations distinct from the obligations of its
individual members. Therefore, the notion of corporate social responsibility as distinct
from the responsibilities of the individual shareholders, is a non-sequitor. It is simply a
logical contradiction.

Clearly, as Millon observes, the contractarians model favour shareholder primacy. In his
words, contractarians
state corporate law provides the terms of the contract by which shareholders
purchase management's undivided loyalty to their welfare… to the extent that
management's pursuit of shareholder welfare threatens nonshareholder interests,
workers, creditors, and other affected nonshareholders are free to bargain with
shareholders (through their agents) for whatever protections they are willing to
pay for. This view assumes that feasible (that is, not excessively costly)
contracting strategies exist for correction of the harmful external effects of
shareholder/management activity and, perhaps, that such effects are relatively
uncommon.145

The contractarian model has number of shortcomings. Critically, it fails to explain the
most significant feature of the corporation: that is to say it does not account for limited
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liability.146 Nor do contractarian models adequately address other corporate rights such
as the right to hold property and the right to freedom of expression, which rights are held
independently of its members.

The univocal focus on efficiency147 supported by contractarian models brings the
question of why efficiency should be set as the prime value. As Millon observes:
“References to efficiency simply beg the underlying question of why efficiency should
provide the sole normative criterion. As a society we have not embraced the market as a
totalizing model for the definition of rights and responsibilities.”148 Furthermore, this
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focus on the bottom line always creates a strong incentive to externalize costs, increase
production, and thereby increase profit.149 As Horrigan observes:
financially based shareholder focus… allows corporations to externalize the costs
of maximizing stock prices onto everyone except the stockholders’ the includes
employees, the environment, consumers, suppliers and the community at large.150
Contractarians are focused on internal corporate activity and apply a cost--benefit
analysis to a relatively narrow range of items that are more easily subject to numeric
measurement.

A further criticism of this view is how it explains the one-person corporation where the
shareholder is also the director. How can one contract with oneself? The legal answer to
this question, of course, comes from the case of Salomon mentioned previously.151

Thus, generally it may be stated that shareholder primacy advocates support and argue
from a contractarian model.152

Concession Theories
Concession theorists note that corporate existence owes its origins to a governmental
concession. In the beginning, governments delegated and granted trading rights to
149
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corporations.153 Corporations were permitted to carry on only those activities authorized
in the concession granted by the government. The limits of the concession were set out
in the articles of incorporation or constitution of the corporation. Given this
concessionary nature of the corporation, the government retained certain rights
concerning the governance and operation of the corporation. Further, as Bottomley
argues, “[corporations] themselves are systems in which power and authority, rights and
obligations, duties and expectation, benefits and disadvantages, are allocated and
exercised…. Each company is a body politic…”154 If one accepts this view of the
corporation, its is easier to see the argument for stakeholder involvement or are least for
government regulation. As a governmental concession, it owes duties back to the
government. This obligation, however, does not extend automatically, to society.155

Dine observes that the concessionaire view is susceptible to the criticism that the
corporation is no more than a mere fiction.156 If it is not made up of the solid, physical
shareholders, acting in concert to create a common enterprise, the corporation has no
more substance than a mere idea. Further, while it may explain the foundation of the
corporation, concession theory fails as an operational theory. It does not explain by
whom or how the corporation is to be run. Nor yet does it set any limits on state
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involvement. Indeed a pure concession view allows the corporation to be a mere
instrument of the state.

157

Models by definition are inadequate representations of the thing they attempt to
represent. In the context of corporate law, this limitation of models is exacerbated by the
complexity of the subject. He goes on to observe:
To say "corporation" is not like saying "chair" or "dog." The reality to which
"corporation" refers is more complex than an easily identifiable material thing or
animal, and any attempt to force a preconceived theory on a complex legal reality
results in what Hart calls "contrivances varying with tastes." The idea of the
corporation is complex precisely because it involves various relationships that
presuppose the rules and principles, and methods of enforcement and compliance
that compose a legal system.158
In fact, as Hart, notes: “a survey of competing theories of ‘the corporation’ leaves one to
conclude that none has survived intact.”159

History and the Development of Models
These models follow an historical development. At the time of monarchical domination
of trade, the concession theory most accurately reflected the state of affairs. As well, the
state’s involvement in the creation of corporations through such things as acts of
legislature also lent weight to the argument for state involvement and enforcement of
broader social interests. With the development of the discipline of economics, the
application of economic theory to law and the increasing interest in efficiency and its
157
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relation to wealth creation, the contractarian models began to take shape and move into a
position of prominence. As the consequence of following this model of the corporation
became clearer, the appropriateness of the model came into question and the theories of
private property and the role of government in the market began to be re-examined. This
re-examination is particularly evident in legislation designed to mitigate costs to nonshareholders in the market for corporate control.160 An understanding of the historical
development of the corporation cannot lead one to any conclusion as to the correct or
appropriate model of the corporation.

The Ideological Divide
Underlying this war of models is a much deeper ideological conflict. Shareholder
advocates start from the idea that people should be free to decide how to live including
how they should dispose of their property. As Millon puts it: “[they focus] on the
individual as an autonomous being…. [and] human liberty as freedom from external,
unconsented-to restraint.” Stakeholder advocates, by contrast, view the individual as set
in a context, and that context is a social context. They view liberty as having positive
duties. From their perspective: “Liberty is empty without taking into account those
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more or less the same path in Anglo jurisdictions.
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primary needs upon which adequate conceptions of individual dignity and human
flourishing depend.”161

There are those who view the corporation as a social body. These scholars view the
corporation as a member of society, and a significant member at that. They emphasize
the power and effects of corporations in society. In addition, they are, in Millon’s words,
“skeptical about the practical efficacy of contract as a mechanism by which
nonshareholders can protect themselves ex ante from… harmful effects.”162 There are
those who view the corporation as a nexus of contracts between private individuals in
which the government has no business and by which the greatest efficiency can be
achieved.

As Millon frames the debate “what does set communitarians apart from contractarians is
the communitarians' strong skepticism toward the baseline presumption that contract
alone should specify the terms of corporate governance relationships.”163 At a
fundamental ideological level, contractarians and communitarians are divided. While
contractarians believe that justice is manifest in the status quo and the only legitimate
interests are those bargained for, as Millon puts it:
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For communitarians, justice does not require endorsement of the existing
distribution of wealth and bargaining capability. They seek instead to reform
corporate law so as to foster individual dignity and promote societal welfare.164
Such deep ideological debates are not about to be settled on the basis of superiority of
models.165

A NORMATIVE COMMENT ON NATURE OF THE
CORPORATION AND CORPORATE LAW
From the foregoing discourse it is evident that the shareholder-stakeholder debate cannot
be resolved by looking at models nor the history of the corporation, or yet by looking at
economics. The economics focus on efficiency is fundamentally at odds with certain
legal principles such as non-oppression of minorities, human rights and social justice.
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connected and affected by its operations and actions. While this view certainly helps address the conflict
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To the extent that the shareholder-stakeholder debate can be resolved, at least for
westerners, it may be by returning to first principles. As Wood puts it: “In short, it [the
duties of business] is a moral question—or more precisely an extra- or pre-legal question
which typically involves complex practical and moral factors.”166 The eighteenth century
British philosopher Edmund Burke observed: “The nature of man is intricate: the objects
of society are of the greatest possible complexity; therefore no simple disposition or
direction of power can be suitable, either to man’s nature, or the quality of his affairs.”167

In essence then, we must ask, what are the objectives of law in general, and of corporate
law in particular. This question needs to be answered as it is asked—in the two parts as
to general and specifics. From the general perspective, Justinian offers that the law ought
to cause a man “to live honesty, not to harm another, and give each his due.”168
Reinterpreted by the modern legal philosopher, John Rawls,169 it can be said that justice
in the distribution of society’s goods is fundamental to a just society. Rawls observes
“Society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.” He argues that we live in a
world of limited resources, and that a just resolution to the conflicts concerning society’s
distribution and use of resources is necessary to have a society in the first place. This he
states is society’s enabling condition.
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This view is reflected even in management literature. As Vinten notes: “to have any
defensible property rights at all, one must recognise a fundamental commitment to
helping those in need.”170 Law’s proper role as concerning justice then is to support such
a distribution. Rawls suggests that equality of opportunity in that he sees the only way to
prevent the stronger (or richer) in his just state from overpowering the weaker (or poorer)
in enforcing the maxim.

This power of corporations has long been recognized: as to financial power in society, by
Dodds, and as to more general influence on society at least since the 1950’s. As noted by
a legal scholar of that era: “‘the corporate organization of business have long ceased to be
private phenomena. That they have a direct impact on the social, economic, and political
life of the nation is no longer a matter of argument.’”171 The current state of the law in
Anglo countries, while permitting shareholder concerns to be overridden in certain
circumstances, through constituency legislation and the business judgment rule, still
places a heavy emphasis on shareholder primacy.172 In fact, directors who wish to
include other stakeholders do so at their peril, both at law and in business.173 Judging by
Rawls principles, this state of the law cannot be correct.
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On the level of the particular, one must ask and attempt to answer the question: What is
the purpose of corporate law? The contractarian answer, that corporate law provides a set
of off the shelf rules for the corporation can hardly be correct. Nor yet can shareholder
primacy theorists’ position of wealth maximization. As Millon observes, “Neither in
practice nor in law has society ever accepted the ruthless, single-minded pursuit of
shareholder wealth maximization as a justified end in itself.”174

As seen from the previous discussion concerning the nature and models of the
corporation, it is not a simple matter. Indeed, as Professor Orts observes, reductionistic
modelling is “not only unhelpful, but destructive.”175 The problem resulting from such
simplification can be seen in the economic argument for shareholder primacy, namely,
the betterment of society. The argument runs as follows: By permitting the market to
operate with the least restrictions, there will be the greatest possible efficiency, creating
the most possible wealth, creating the greatest quantity of goods possible available to
174
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society. In other words, by permitting the markets to operate with the highest level of
efficiency—corporations focused exclusively on wealth production—the greatest social
good will be achieved.176

Taking Hart’s rule based analysis Orts identify complexity results from corporate law’s
normative conflicts. He discusses the following conflicting norms. The divided
economic object: profit vs. wealth, short vs. long term, central management vs. dispersed
capital providers, capital accumulation, protection of investors, and the protection of
other interests. He then notes that following the law serves as an objective in itself
referring to the thinking and terminology of Dean Clark who describes this as “modest
idealism.” In such instances managers may cause a corporation to take a course of action
that produces a lesser profit but complies with the law when non-compliance would be
more profitable for the purpose of honouring the social-moral ideal of following the
law.177 Finally, Orts notes the ethical dimension of corporate law that allows for the
noneconomic considerations of ethics and justice.178 As Orts observes: “policies
underlying corporate law cannot be reduced to a unidimensional value, such as the
economic objective of ‘maximizing shareholders' wealth’ or even, more generally,
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‘economic efficiency.’” 179 But a discussion of normative corporate law should go
beyond a mere distillation of principles and objects in the particular area of law.

Millon posits four norms for corporate law. He suggests that it should (1) promote stable
relations between certain non-shareholder constituencies and the corporation, (2) adjust
the gains between shareholders and non-shareholders, (3) address the fairness in
allocation of transaction costs, and (4) look for ways to include in decision making those
most directly effected by such decisions.180 Orts adds, “Corporate law, like most law, is
primarily about the rule--oriented structuring of social power, and it is specifically about
the rules that structure the organization of economic power.”181 Following Rawls,
therefore, a strong argument can be made that corporate law should include access to
power by non-shareholders.182 By such standards, Australia’s CLERP objectives:
Market Freedom, Investor Protection, Information Transparency, Cost Effectiveness,
Regulatory Neutrality and flexibility, Business Ethics and Compliance appear
inadequate.183
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Corporate law, like all law, should have as its purpose the betterment of society. Farrar
takes the position that the fundamental tenet of corporate law, the independent legal
entity doctrine, is fundamentally flawed and fails to meet or promote any of the three
criteria advocated by Justinian.184 Wood notes that the effect of limited liability is to pass
on the costs of business failure to others, and in the collapse of a big firm, a multitude of
smaller victims or involuntary stakeholders.185 Corporate law that permits and promotes
the on-going externalisation of business costs is contrary to the fundamental principles of
justice.186 Shareholder primacy creates another problem in situations where hyper norms
are involved. Such norms, argues Dunfee, “serve to judge, and if necessary to invalidate,
local laws and local morality…. [they] entail principles… fundamental to human
existence”.187

The effect of current corporate law emphasizing shareholder interests is just the opposite.
Recent computer modelling of the current free market economic model suggests that this
concentration will increase, not decrease.188 This trend of increasing concentration of
wealth suggests that a more fundamental modification to corporate law is called for.
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Corporate law that permits and promotes increased inequalities between members of
society too is fundamentally flawed for the reason that it contradicts the basic principles
of justice. Admittedly, the distributive aspect could be dealt with through tax law;
however, the fact that current Anglo corporate law with its heavy shareholder focus tends
to exacerbate social inequalities, both political and economic suggests that a profound reexamination of corporate law and corporate law reform is well overdue.

It is unsupportable that corporations which, as Dine points out,
account for most of the world’s industrial capacity, technological knowledge and
international financial transactions… mine, refine and distribute most of the
world’s oil,… extract most of the world’s minerals… harvest much of the world’s
wood… grow many of the world’s agricultural crops, while processing and
distributing much of its food… hold 90 per cent of all technology and product
patents worldwide and are involved in 70 percent of world trade189
should be only answerable to those relatively few who have the wealth to be
shareholders.190

CONCLUSION
The shareholder-stakeholder debate is a highly complex, multi-faceted, interdisciplinary
debate. As such it cannot be answered easily or completely. As Wood observes
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Concerning the shareholder conception, the weakness is moral and the strength
practical; in the case of the stakeholder conception, the position is reversed. The
shareholder conception therefore stands… in need of moral rehabilitation, and the
stakeholder conception in need of practical rehabilitation.191

From the perspective of this author the broader perspective of the role of the corporation
in society seems to be the more realistic, logical perspective. If one takes that to be the
better position, let us briefly put the four answers to the four questions of corporate
governance.

What is the entity being governed? A combined answer looking at legal, economic, social
and dynamic aspects may serve us best. One such definition is offered by Clarkson who
writes: ‘‘‘The Firm’ is a system of stake holders operating within the larger system of the
host society that provides the necessary legal an market infrastructure for the firm’s
activities. The purpose of the firm is to create wealth or value for its stake holders by
converting their stake into goods and services.”192

By whom it should be governed? I would suggest that it be governed by a multi-tiered
board including other stakeholders. This suggestion is not impractical as can be seen by
the relative efficacy of other stakeholder models of boards, such as the German model.
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What is the best way to govern it? By permitting the corporation to pursue its
commercial ends within more broadly drafted corporate statutes mandating a broader
range of interests and integrating into the governance structure people whose interests
more broadly represent the community of stakeholders effected by the corporation a
corporation can be well governed. The disclosure requirements of shareholder theory
should be kept, but the accounting amplified to include “triple bottom line” or “quadruple
bottom line” regimes.

And finally, in whose interests should the entity be governed? Given the great impact of
corporations on society, the narrow shareholder primacy view advocating the operation of
corporations for the exclusive interests of people with sufficient wealth to be shareholders
can no longer be supported. Corporations must be run for the benefit of society. While
not supporting a model where corporations are merely instruments of the state, these
entities must be run for the broader interests of society.

Horrigan offers an interesting criticism of the whole shareholder-stakeholder debate. He
focuses on what he believes is the falsely dichotomous structure of the debate and
suggests that a reframing of the issue, as the effective functioning of different elements of
society would serve all interests best.193

Perhaps the best way to express this view as an aspiration for corporate law can be found
in the words of Orts:
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Wise policy makers… should not convert the framework of corporate law into
either an unfeeling gauntlet of economic madness nor an overly sanguine vision
of do--good business. New directions in corporate law should instead take society
on a course that is morally and politically uplifting, as well as economically
productive.194

The current growing stakeholder views may permit us to limit the externalising of social
and environmental costs done in favour of maximizing shareholder wealth and ultimately
save our planet from destruction, permitting us to say with Scrooge, the reluctant
stakeholder: “the shadows of the things that would have been, may be dispelled.”195
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